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For all of the ways in which the Sabia case' is extraordinary, its outcome-
settlement-is decidedly ordinary. In most civil litigation, as in the Sabias' litiga-
tion against Dr. Maryellen Humes and Norwalk Hospital, "[s]ettlement is where
the action is."'2 Roughly two-thirds of all cases settle3 (and most of the rest are
resolved through motions4). Why do most cases settle? Given the costs, delay,
and unpleasantness of the litigation process, why do any cases go to trial?
To address these questions-that is, to explain why most cases settle as well
as why some cases "fail"5 to settle and result in trial-legal academics have de-
veloped several theoretical accounts of litigation behavior in "ordinary, 6 civil
cases. These accounts fall into two basic categories: (1) rational actor accounts
(which assume that litigants are outcome-maximizers), and (2) non-rational actor
* Professor of Law, Vanderbilt University Law School. B.A., Stanford University; Ed.M., Har-
vard University; J.D., Stanford University. For their participation in this project, I thank my former
colleagues at the University of Missouri-Columbia. For providing financial support, I thank the Hew-
lett Foundation.
1. BARRY WERTH, DAMAGES: ONE FAMILY'S LEGAL STRUGGLES IN THE WORLD OF MEDICINE
(1998).
2. Michael J. Saks, Do We Really Know Anything about the Behavior of the Tort Litigation Svs-
tem-And Why Not?, 140 U. PA. L. REV. 1147, 1212 (1992).
3. See, e.g., Marc Galanter & Mia Cahill, "Most Cases Settle ": Judicial Promotion and Regulation
of Settlements, 46 STAN. L. REV. 1339, 1339-40 (1994) (relying, in part, on the Kritzer study, stating
that the often cited eighty-five to ninety-five percent settlement rates are misleading because they
represent all civil cases that do not go to trial as opposed to limiting the definition of settle to those
resolved solely by agreement between the parties without any decision by an authoritative decision
maker).
4. See, e.g., Chris Guthrie, Procedural Justice Research and the Paucity of Trials, 2002 J. DIsP.
RESOL. 127 (using databases maintained by Professors Theodore Eisenberg and Kevin Clermont to
show that one to four percent of federal and state cases result in trial); Judith Resnik, Failing Faith:
Adjudicatory Procedure in Decline, 53 U. CHI. L. REV. 494, 511-12 (1986) (citing an estimate by an
employee of the Administrative Office of the United States Courts that "some thirty-five percent of all
federal cases are disposed of by rulings on motions for dismissal or for summary judgment").
5. Most legal scholars treat trial as a failure. See, e.g., Samuel R. Gross & Kent D. Syverud, Get-
ting to No: A Study of Settlement Negotiations and the Selection of Cases for Trial, 90 MICH. L. REV.
319, 320 (1991).
A trial is a failure. Although we celebrate it as the centerpiece of our system of justice, we know
that trial is not only an uncommon method of resolving disputes, but a disfavored one. With
some notable exceptions, lawyers, judges, and commentators agree that pretrial settlement is al-
most always cheaper, faster, and better than trial.
Id For contrasting views, see Owen M. Fiss, Against Settlement, 93 YALE L.J. 1073 (1984) (celebrat-
ing the virtues of public trials versus private settlements) and Judith Resnik, Trial as Error, Jurisdic-
tion as Injury: Transforming the Meaning ofArticle 111, 113 HARV. L. REV. 924 (2000).
6. See Chris Guthrie, Framing Frivolous Litigation: A Psychological Theory, 67 U. CHI. L. REV.
163, 168 (2000) (describing "ordinary" litigation as that in which plaintiffs have at least a moderate
probability of recovering money damages at trial) [hereinafter Guthrie, Frivolous Framing].
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accounts (which assume that litigants want to maximize their outcomes but have
difficulty doing so).
The purpose of this article is to introduce these academic accounts of settle-
ment and to consider whether they provide insight into the settlement of the
Sabias' litigation against Humes and Norwalk. I believe these accounts are
largely complementary rather than competing, so my own view is that each sheds
some light on litigation and settlement behavior in most civil cases (including the
Sabia case).
II. RATIONAL ACTOR ACCOUNTS
The prevailing accounts of litigation behavior assume that litigants are "ra-
tional actors." The basic idea with respect to these rational actor accounts is that
litigants will make decisions in accordance with various logical axioms in an ef-
fort to maximize their outcomes in the litigation process. The two rational actor
accounts of litigation behavior are the Economic Theory of Suit and Settlement
and the Strategic Bargaining Theory.
A. The Economic Theory of Suit and Settlement
The Economic Theory of Suit and Settlement, developed most fully by Pro-
fessors George Priest and Benjamin Klein,7 assumes that litigants make risk-
neutral or risk-averse choices to maximize their outcomes in litigation. When
deciding whether to settle a case or go forward to trial, the Economic Theory pre-
dicts that litigants compare the value of settlement to the expected value of trial
and select whichever of the options promises more value. Because the costs of
trying a case almost invariably exceed the costs of settlement, the Economic The-
ory predicts that litigants will settle most cases as a way of saving costs. Trials
result only where litigants develop divergent expectations about likely trial out-
comes so that the parties cannot agree on a settlement range. Professors Samuel
Gross and Kent Syverud explain the Priest and Klein model as follows:
Priest and Klein assume that the parties will settle whenever the defen-
dant's maximum offer is greater than the plaintiffs minimum demand.
Because litigation costs are added to the defendant's maximum offer and
subtracted from the plaintiffs minimum demand, settlement will nor-
mally occur. Indeed, if plaintiffs and defendants always agreed in their
predictions of trial outcomes, there would be no trials at all. But the par-
ties do not always agree, and their disagreements can lead to very differ-
ent assessments of the expected judgment. As a result, the plaintiff's
minimum demand will sometimes exceed the defendant's maximum of-
fer. In that situation, Priest and Klein tacitly assume that the parties nei-
ther bargain nor litigate strategically. The litigants make demands and
offers, they settle or try cases, solely because of what they expect the
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court will do, and not at all because of how they expect opposing parties
to respond.8
*** Notes & Questions ***
(1) Does this theory explain why cases settle and why cases go to trial? Does
it explain the outcome in the Sabias' litigation with Humes or Norwalk?
(2) Following the Sabia case, Michael Koskoff stopped trying medical mal-
practice cases. Barry Werth's explanation of Koskoff's decision suggests that
Koskoff would endorse the Economic Theory's account of medical malpractice
litigation:
Mike Koskoff stopped trying medical malpractice cases, not because his
office wasn't handling them but because virtually all of the large cases in
which he was personally involved now settled through negotiation. Part
of this was due to Koskoff himself. Insurance companies doing business
in Connecticut recognized that his careful screening of cases, his ability
to hire and prepare top medical experts, and his courtroom skills made it
risky to go to trial against the firm in cases with high exposure. Other
factors also militated against claimants holding out for trial: plaintiffs'
frustrations with ever-lengthening delays, the availability of alternative
methods of dispute resolution, the rising costs of litigation, and the fact
that there was no longer much guesswork about what big-ticket medical
malpractice cases were worth. Jury verdicts in excess of $20 million
were routinely knocked down on appeal to between $7 and $8 million.
Even without malpractice reform or health-care reform, both of which
collapsed with the failed Clinton health-care proposal, the medical liabil-
ity system had become more rational because it had become more mar-
ket-driven, at least at the top. Lawyers still needed to prepare as if trials
were inevitable, but trials were no longer necessary to determine what
cases were worth. Disputes like the one over Little Tony's life expec-
tancy started to disappear from the bargaining table.9
B. Strategic Bargaining Theory
Strategic bargaining theorists, most notably Professors Robert Mnookin and
Lewis Kornhauser, 10 elaborated on the Economic Theory of Suit and Settlement
by positing that rational litigants will seek to bargain with one another in order to
obtain more favorable settlements. Thus, for strategic bargaining theorists, nego-
tiated outcomes are determined not only by the litigants' expectations about likely
trial outcomes" but also by the litigants' strategic bargaining behavior. Professors
8. Gross & Syverud, supra note 5, at 324.
9. WERTH, supra note 1, at 373-74 (emphasis added).
10. Robert H. Mnookin & Lewis Komhauser, Bargaining in the Shadow of the Law: The Case of
Divorce, 88 YALE L.J. 950 (1979). See also Robert Cooter et al., Bargaining in the Shadow of the
Law: A Testable Model of Strategic Behavior, II J. LEGAL STUD. 225 (1982).
11. See supra Part II.A.
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Gross and Syverud describe the Mnookin and Kornhauser strategic bargaining
theory as follows:
Pretrial bargaining is strategic. The predicted trial outcome may inform a
litigant's strategy, but it cannot determine it, since even a perfect predic-
tion leaves crucial questions unanswered: What fraction or multiple of
the expected judgment should the litigant offer, and when? How quickly
and in what fashion should she respond to an offer by the other side?
Under what circumstances should a party make a sincere offer? An out-
rageous demand? An insincere threat to go to trial? Despite extensive
research, no general theory even claims to describe the optimal settle-
ment strategy. Bargaining remains an art rather than a science.
Bargaining theory has provided an interesting and complex view of the
process that leads cases to be tried. The first major statement of that
view was presented in Robert Mnookin and Lewis Komhauser's 1979 ar-
ticle, "Bargaining in the Shadow of the Law: The Case of Divorce." The
central point of this article is consistent with Priest and Klein's frame-
work: litigants order their private, out-of-court negotiations around the
substantive law and procedure that will be applied if the negotiations
break down and the court steps out of the shadows to adjudicate the dis-
pute. But Mnookin and Kornhauser also argue that an array of other fac-
tors affect negotiating behavior ... [including] strategic behavior .... 12
* * * Notes & Questions * * *
(1) Did the lawyers representing the parties in the Sabia case engage in any
strategic bargaining tactics? Consider the following:
(a) Offers of judgment: Rule 68 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
and many state codes authorize litigants to make "offers of judgment" to one an-
other. An offer of judgment is designed "to significantly increase the incentives
for settlement by attaching financial penalties (through a cost-shifting mechanism)
to the rejection of a settlement offer that was eventually proved (by the verdict) to
have been reasonable."' 3 If a litigant rejects an offer and then fails to recover
more at trial, the litigant must pay post-offer costs incurred by her adversary. 4
On behalf of the Sabias, Chris Bernard filed offers of judgment against both
Humes and Norwalk:
Bernard filed two separate "offers of judgment" in Bridgeport Superior
Court. Aimed at Norwalk Hospital and Humes, these were largely set-
12. Gross & Syverud, supra note 5, at 327-28. It is worth noting that though Mnookin and Kom-
hauser built their theory on the Economic Theory, they did acknowledge "non-rational" factors that
might influence bargaining, including, for example, the litigants' feelings toward one another. See
Mnookin & Komhauser, supra note 10.
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tlement devices, legal notification of what the Sabias would accept to
drop their case ....
An offer of judgment started the clock on settlement negotiations
whether both sides were interested or not, and it was one of the few tools
available to plaintiffs to begin such discussions, in effect by announcing
their willingness to settle for, and only for, a stated price, then forcing the
other side to respond. Such offers were notoriously unrealistic, but de-
fendants had to treat them seriously. If they refused, and a verdict ulti-
mately matched or exceeded the plaintiffs' offer, they would have to pay
for any added losses due to the delay. Explains Koskoff, "What we
wanted to say to the defendants and their insurance companies was, 'We
think if we go to trial, we're going to get more than this. If you don't ac-
cept, you could end up on the hook not only for the verdict, but twelve
percent a year for the difference."' The offers of judgment against the
hospital and Humes were $15 million and $2 million, respectively, the
top limits of their insurance coverage.
1 5
(b) Settlement presentation: The plaintiffs' offer of judgment appeared to
backfire after Koskoff made his settlement presentation to the Norwalk Hospital
executives. Koskoff began by making the case for liability and then addressed
damages. He told the executives that the plaintiffs valued the case at $22,227,463
(seven million dollars more than the offer of judgment). Here is how the Norwalk
executives reacted to the presentation:
Koskoff remained standing. No one spoke.
Finally, Osborne [the hospital president and CEO] broke the silence. "I
thought the case was for $15 million. That was the offer of judgment.
Where did you get $22 million?"
Koskoff thought for a second. He might have said that he was trying to
grab their attention. Or that, as they could see, he was well prepared and
they had better be ready to talk serious money because Koskoff thought
he could try the case and get a verdict of $22 million. Or that although
his professed goal was to go to trial, it was an open secret that ninety per-
cent of cases settled, and he was purposely putting up a big number in
order to leave room to negotiate. He might even have said that pain and
suffering, those damages promoted so successfully by his father and un-
cle, had lately become the chief inflator of jury awards and thus the main
area where price ultimately was negotiated, so he was now asking for $10
million for those damages rather than the $2.5 million he'd estimated ear-
lier. Instead, he simply told them he had revalued the case.
An uncomfortable silence followed. At last Osborne stood up and
thanked Koskoff and Bernard for coming. Koskoff was baffled by this
15. WERTH, supra note 1, at 178.
2004]
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brusque dismissal. The hospital had invited him up to hear his case, yet
when he finished, no one responded. He didn't expect them to accept his
terms, but he expected something, some discussion. He had never seen
anything like it.'
6
(c) Pre-trial motions as "bargaining chips"' 7: As the litigation progressed,
Koskoff filed two "last-minute" motions as a way of posturing for settlement:
Typically, Koskoff thought he couldn't lose. He believed that Doyle-
though he would never admit it-knew it too, and he wanted Doyle to re-
consider whether going to court was in his client's best interest. As part
of the housekeeping of setting the issues for trial, Koskoff now entered
two last-minute pleadings. Both were meant to remind Doyle what he
would be up against, all too soon, if Travelers still refused to discuss re-
solving the case.
18
III. NON-RATIONAL ACTOR ACCOUNTS
Legal scholars have also developed non-rational actor accounts of litigation
behavior. These psychology-based theories challenge the rational-actor assump-
tion underlying the economic and strategic bargaining theories. Relying on em-
pirical evidence of predictable patterns of mental processing, these theories pur-
port to describe the way litigants will actually behave when making settlement
decisions. The virtue of these psychological theories is that they rest on empirical
observations about human behavior; precisely for that reason, however, they are
much less elegant than the rational actor theories (which make questionable as-
sumptions about human behavior but generate straightforward predictions about
case outcomes).
A. The Framing Theory
Psychologists have discovered that when people face risk or uncertainty, they
make decisions by comparing the available options to the status quo position.
When the options appear to be gains, people tend to make risk-averse decisions
and select the safe option; when options appear to be losses, however, people tend
to make risk-seeking decisions and select the gamble. Legal scholars have used
this insight, formalized by Professors Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky in
"prospect theory,"' 9 to explain suit and settlement behavior. In an article on frivo-
lous litigation,20 I explain the "framing theory" 2' as follows:
16. Id. at 251.
17. Id. at 268.
18. Id. at 266.
19. See Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky, Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decision under Risk,
47 ECONOMETRICA 263 (1979).
20. Guthrie, Frivolous Framing, supra note 6.
21. Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, Gains, Losses, and the Psychology of Litigation, 70 S. CAL. L. REV. 113
(1996). See also ROBIN M. HOGARTH, JUDGEMENT AND CHOICE 105 (2d ed. 1987) ("Prospect theory
therefore predicts that whereas the plaintiff would settle out of court (i.e. take the safe option), the
[Vol. I
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The Framing Theory of Litigation posits that litigants, like decision-
makers generally, evaluate decision options relative to the current state of
affairs and make risk-averse decisions when choosing between gains and
risk-seeking decisions when choosing between losses. When deciding
whether to settle a case or go forward to trial, the Framing Theory thus
predicts that plaintiffs are likely to prefer the risk-averse option-
settlement-because they view both settlement and trial as gains, while
defendants are more likely to prefer the risk-seeking option-trial-
because they view both settlement and trial as losses.22
Scholars have collected experimental evidence supporting the Framing The-
ory. In one simple illustration, Professor Jeffrey Rachlinski gave a copyright liti-
gation problem to law students, some of whom played the role of plaintiff and
some the role of defendant.23 Rachlinski gave the plaintiff-subjects a choice be-
tween a certain $200,000 settlement and a fifty percent chance of winning
$400,000 at trial (along with a fifty percent chance of winning $0) and the defen-
dant-subjects a choice between paying a $200,000 settlement to the plaintiff and a
fifty percent chance of losing $400,000 at trial (along with a fifty percent chance
of losing $0).24 Rachlinski found that seventy-seven percent of plaintiff-subjects
preferred to settle while sixty-nine percent of defendant-subjects preferred trial.
25
Rachlinski concluded that:
Litigation appears to supply a natural frame. When deciding whether to
settle a case, plaintiffs consistently choose between a sure gain by set-
tling and the prospect of winning more at trial. This closely resembles a
gains frame .... Conversely, defendants choose between a sure loss by
settling and the prospect of losing more at trial. This is a choice made in
a loss frame. Hence, cross-claims aside, litigation presents a fairly con-
sistent frame.26
*** Notes & Questions ***
(1) Do you find the Framing Theory persuasive? Assuming for the moment
that you do, who is likely to do "better" in settlement talks? Plaintiffs (who are
risk averse) or defendants (who are risk seeking)? Why?
defendant would prefer to go to court (i.e. the risky alternative)."); Linda Babcock et al., Forming
Beliefs about Adjudicated Outcomes: Perceptions of Risk and Reservation Values, 15 INT'L REV. L. &
ECON. 289 (1995) (examining framing in a hypothetical products liability case); Russell Korobkin &
Chris Guthrie, Psychological Barriers to Litigation Settlement: An Experimental Approach, 93 MICH.
L. REV. 107, 129-42 (1994) (positing that the framing of an offer will affect settlement rates); Peter J.
van Koppen, Risk Taking in Civil Law Negotiations, 14 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 151 (1990) (providing
evidence consistent with framing).
22. Guthrie, Frivolous Framing, supra note 6, at 167-68.
23. Rachlinski, supra note 21, at 128-29.
24. Id.
25. Id.
26. Id. at 129.
2004]
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(2) Do you think this account applies to frivolous or low-probability litigation
the same way that it applies to regular cases? In other words, do you think plain-
tiffs in frivolous cases are likely to be risk averse and defendants risk seeking?
27
(3) The Framing Theory's central insight is that litigation involves risky or
uncertain decision-making and that people confronted with decisions of this type
seem to decide in predictable, non-maximizing ways. Is there any evidence to
suggest that the Framing Theory influenced the decisions of the litigants or law-
yers in the Sabia case?
Koskoff accepts the Framing Theory's central insight about litigation deci-
sion-making-"settlements were almost always a last-ditch means of avoiding the
uncertainty of putting a case to a jury."28 Do you think he accepts the Framing
Theory's predictions about how plaintiffs and defendants will respond to that
uncertainty?
B. The Regret Aversion Theory
Litigation decision-making creates a palpable possibility of regret. Because
regret is an unpleasant emotion, litigants are motivated to make decisions during
the process that decrease the likelihood they will experience post-litigation regret.
Given the structure of the civil justice system, this means that most litigants will
be motivated to settle:
When confronted with difficult litigation decisions, like whether to settle
a case or go forward with trial, litigants will likely number-crunch, calcu-
late, and value-maximize, as the Economic and Framing Theories pre-
dict, but they will also feel a range of actual and prospective emotion that
they will incorporate into their decision-making. Legal scholars seeking
to understand, describe, and perhaps even modify litigation behavior
need not abandon their elegant, "calculating" theories, but they need to
couple them with richer theories that take the reality-not just the ration-
29ality-of human beings into account.
Building on modem regret theory, I propose in this article the Regret
Aversion Theory of Litigation Behavior. This theory posits that litigants
seek to make litigation decisions that minimize the likelihood they will
experience post-litigation regret. In our litigation system, litigants gener-
ally must choose between settling and trying their cases. Litigants who
settle never learn what they would have recovered at trial, but litigants
who reject settlement offers in favor of trial learn the outcomes of both
options. Settlement, thus, offers litigants an opportunity to avoid, or at
least minimize, regret, while trial increases the likelihood litigants will
experience regret. Given the structure of our litigation system, the Regret
27. See Guthrie, Frivolous Framing, supra note 6 (demonstrating experimentally that plaintiff and
defendant risk preferences are reversed in frivolous or low-probability cases and exploring the implica-
tions of this finding for settlement behavior).
28. WERTH, supra note 1, at 296.
29. Chris Guthrie, Better Settle Than Sorry: The Regret Aversion Theory of Litigation Behavior,
1999 U. ILL. L. REV. 43, 61-62.
[Vol. I
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Aversion Theory posits that litigants will choose settlement over trial to
avoid feelings of regret associated with learning after trial that they
should have settled.3 °
To test the Regret Aversion Theory, I provided law student-subjects with a
hypothetical scenario called "Overtime":
I administered the first scenario-"Overtime"--to twenty-seven students.
In this scenario, the students read about two identical disputes, one be-
tween Lisa and her employer and the other between Martha and her em-
ployer. Lisa and Martha believe their respective employers, Company
ABC and Company XYZ, have failed to pay them overtime compensa-
tion. To recover the overtime compensation they believe they are owed,
Lisa and Martha have filed suit against their respective employers, seek-
ing payment of $5,000.
Each learns from her lawyer that due to "the vagueness of the law and the
particular characteristics of her job" she has a "fifty percent chance of re-
covering $5,000 and a fifty percent chance of recovering $0, depending
upon whether the judge finds her to be a 'non-exempt' or an 'exempt'
employee." Thus, both Lisa and Martha face an expected trial verdict
valued at $2,500-i.e., fifty percent chance x $5,000 + fifty percent
chance x $0 = $2,500 expected value. Immediately prior to the hearing,
Company ABC offers to settle Lisa's claim for $2,500, and Company
XYZ offers to settle Martha's claim for $2,500. Thus, each faces a
choice between a certain $2,500 settlement on the one hand and an ex-
pected trial value of $2,500 on the other hand.
Lisa, the subjects learn, "is litigating in a jurisdiction where the judge
will cease to participate in the case upon learning that the parties have
reached an out-of-court settlement." Because Lisa is litigating in a "tra-
ditional" jurisdiction, she will not learn what the judge would have de-
cided at the hearing if she accepts the settlement offer. Martha, by con-
trast, is litigating in a "regret" jurisdiction. She, the subjects learn, "is
litigating in a jurisdiction where the judge is required, upon learning that
the parties have reached an out-of-court settlement, to inform the parties
of what he would have awarded at the hearing." Because Martha is liti-
gating in a regret jurisdiction, she will learn what the judge would have
decided at the hearing if she accepts the $2,500 settlement offer. The
subjects are then asked to indicate which of the plaintiffs-Lisa or Mar-
tha-is "most likely to accept the settlement offer.",
3 1
Although Lisa and Martha faced identical substantive decisions, the emo-
tional consequences of settling were quite different because Lisa could minimize
regret by settling but Martha could not. Consistent with regret theory, I found that
30. Id. at 72-73.
31. Id. at 74-75.
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subjects overwhelmingly indicated that Lisa was more likely to settle (81.5% of
subjects). I asked the subjects to indicate why:
Most students provided answers consistent with the proposed Regret
Aversion Theory. "If Martha takes the $2,500 [and] settles," one respon-
dent explained, "there is a chance that she will have to hear from the
judge that she could have got [sic] the full $5,000. Knowing that the
judge could say she is entitled to the full $5,000 when she already ac-
cepted the $2,500 is something she will not want to hear." Another re-
spondent explained that Lisa "can be confident that she did what was best
for her, whereas Martha may learn later that the judge would have ruled
for her. That knowledge could be an emotional blow to Martha." And
still another explained, "I think that the plaintiff in the jurisdiction where
the judge ceases to participate upon settlement is most likely to [settle]
because never knowing what the judge would have decided, whether she
would have been better or worse off, will leave the least amount of re-
gret."
33
*** Notes & Questions ***
(1) The "Overtime" vignette reported above suggests that plaintiffs are likely
to settle due to regret aversion, but what about defendants? In another vignette, I
found evidence suggesting that defendants are also likely to settle due to regret
aversion. 34 This latter finding arguably contrasts with the Framing Theory, which
predicts that defendants are risk-seeking rather than regret-averse.
(2) Does regret aversion influence the litigants and lawyers in the Sabia case
to settle?
(a) Consider Bernard's ruminations on recommending to the Sabias that
they reject Travelers' settlement proposal:
Approaching trial was one thing; going to court after turning down a
multimillion dollar offer was another. Protective of Tony and Donna,
Bernard was nagged by doubt. He worried that by encouraging the
Sabias to reject Travelers' proposal, however inadequate, he and Koskoff
may have doomed them to a far worse fate: "How would you like to be
the one to say to Big Tony Sabia, 'I'm sorry, we lost. You're going to
have to go back to living the way you've been living."' Mediations, he
knew, are more difficult for trial lawyers than trials are. In court every-
thing is black and white-you argue your case, give it all you've got, and
if you lose, as Ted Koskoff used to say, the judge and jury were against
you from the start. But failing to reach a settlement once negotiations
32. Id. at 75.
33. Id. at 76.
34. Id. at 77-79.
[Vol. I
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began left only yourself to blame and carried the legal and moral weight
of having rejected a suboptimal deal for possibly none at all. 35
(b) Or consider Bill Doyle's use of a motion to strike as a way of inducing
the Sabias to settle due to anticipated regret:
Doyle as promised filed his last-minute motion to strike Donna's claim
for emotional stress. With a trial imminent, he wanted the Sabias to
know that one of the costs of refusing to settle was that Donna might well
end up with no money of her own. Whether or not he knew the intimate
details of the Sabias' domestic history, he, like Koskoff, knew exactly
which buttons to push to make his opponents squirm.
36
(3) Trial creates a salient possibility of regret because it is almost invariably
preceded by the rejection of some certain settlement amount, but it is worth ob-
serving that litigants and lawyers can also feel regret following settlement. In the
following excerpt, Tony Sabia expresses regret following the Sabias' acceptance
of the Norwalk settlement:
"You mean I'm going to walk out of here with a check and that's going
to be it? Is that all it means?" Tony asked, his voice steeped in remorse.
Already he was "kicking myself in the ass, because I watched that guy
[Doyle] agree with everything Michael said." They had gotten it over
with, Donna would say, but for what purpose, and at what price, she and
Tony still didn't know.37
Koskoff's reaction to Tony's initial expression of regret is instructive:
After they left, Koskoff chatted with Bernard and Lichtenstein, and then
sat alone at his desk, decompressing from the past week. He understood
the Sabias' regrets but thought he had saved them from something much
worse: yet another crushing disappointment followed by the wait for a
trial that still might not happen. "That," he says, "would have really de-
stroyed them." By ending their case now, he had done probably as well
for them as any lawyer could have. A trial might have satisfied their
craving for justice and revenge, but not their need to get on with their
lives, which Koskoff considered ultimately more important. Tony had
once asked: "Who the hell could ever dream that a flcking nightmare
like this would ever happen? Not us." Yet Koskoff saw nightmares like
theirs every day; most not as bad, a few worse. As a trial lawyer and
public performer, he preferred to go to court, but he had learned that it
35. WERTH, supra note 1, at 327.
36. Id. at 331.
37. Id. at 369.
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was far better for everyone not to, provided the defendant's insurer could
be forced to pay.38
C. Settlement Factors
Legal scholars devised the Framing Theory and the Regret Aversion Theory
to provide fully developed, non-rational actor accounts of litigation and settle-
ment. Legal scholars have also identified other psychological phenomena that
may systematically influence litigation behavior. Although these phenomena do
not lend themselves to comprehensive litigation theories, they can play a signifi-
cant role in suit and settlement nonetheless. Below, I consider four of these phe-
nomena: anchoring, reciprocity, scarcity, and vindication seeking.
1. Anchoring
When people make numerical estimates, they tend to rely heavily on the ini-
tial value available to them. This initial value serves as an "anchor" that often
exerts undue influence on their final estimates. As Professors Tversky and Kah-
neman explain it, "different starting points yield different estimates, which are
biased toward initial values." 39 Anchors can have a significant impact on litiga-
tion behavior:
Litigation frequently produces anchors. In settlement talks, for instance,
litigants can be influenced by the opening offers that their adversaries
make. Professors Russell Korobkin and Chris Guthrie found that people
evaluating hypothetical settlement offers were more likely to accept a
$12,000 final settlement offer when it followed a $2,000 opening offer
than when it followed a $10,000 opening offer. Korobkin and Guthrie
hypothesized that those who received the $2,000 opening offer expected
to settle for a relatively small amount, so the $12,000 final offer seemed
generous by comparison. On the other hand, those who received the
$10,000 opening offer expected to settle for relatively more, so the
$12,000 final offer seemed relatively stingy. The opening offers effec-
tively "anchored subjects' expectations" and influenced their settlement
preferences.40
*** Notes & Questions ** *
(1) Do you think that anchoring really influences decision-making? Is there
any evidence that anchoring influenced the outcome in the Sabias' litigation?
How about the policy limits on Humes' and Norwalk's insurance policies? Did
those figures irrationally influence the way the lawyers valued the Sabia case?
38. Id.
39. Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Judgment under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases,
reprinted in JUDGMENT UNDER UNCERTAINTY 13 (Daneil Kahneman et al. eds., 1982).
40. Chris Guthrie et al., Inside the Judicial Mind, 86 CORNELL L. REV. 777, 789 (2001).
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(2) If the case had gone to trial, do you think anchoring might have influenced
the jurors' decisions? In several studies, researchers have found that plaintiffs'
lawyers' damage requests influenced mock jurors' assessments of the appropriate
damages to award in civil cases.4'
2. Reciprocity
Settlement behavior is also influenced by the so-called "reciprocity rule. 42
According to this rule-which appears to operate in all cultures 43-people tend to
feel obligated "to repay, in kind, what another person has provided us.' 4 As Pro-
fessor Robert Cialdini explains, the reciprocity rule sheds light on concession
making:
It is in the interest of any human group to have its members working to-
gether toward the achievement of common goals. However, in many so-
cial interactions the participants begin with requirements and demands
that are unacceptable to one another. Thus, the society must arrange to
have these initial, incompatible desires set aside for the sake of socially
beneficial cooperation. This is accomplished through procedures that
promote compromise. Mutual concession is one important such proce-
dure.
The reciprocation rule brings about mutual concession in two ways. The
first is obvious; it pressures the recipient of an already-made concession
to respond in kind. The second, while not so obvious, is pivotally impor-
tant. Because of a recipient's obligation to reciprocate, people are freed
to make the initial concession and, thereby, to begin the beneficial proc-
ess of exchange. After all, if there were no social obligation to recipro-
cate a concession, who would want to make the first sacrifice? To do so
would be to risk giving up something and getting nothing back. How-
ever, with the rule in effect, we can feel safe making the first sacrifice to
our partner, who is obligated to offer a return sacrifice.45
* * * Notes & Questions * * *
(1) In what ways do you think the reciprocity rule may have influenced be-
havior in the Sabia case?
(a) Did the reciprocity rule influence the lawyers' expectations regarding
discovery? Consider the following:
Karen's job was to amass all the relevant facts in Sabia, a grinding proc-
ess known optimistically as "discovery." She knew what to expect-
41. For a summary, see id. at 789-90.
42. ROBERT B. CIALDINI, INFLUENCE: SCIENCE AND PRACTICE 20 (4th ed. 2001).
43. Id. at 20-21.
44. Id. at 20.
45. Id. at 37-38.
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very little. The goal once a lawsuit has been filed is for both sides to
come to a common understanding of events. Without this there can be
little hope of a focused trial or fair result. But lawyers have far more in-
terest in gaining information than in yielding it and are disinclined to
make things easier for their opponents than they have to. Now that Sabia
was in litigation, it was up to the lawyers to submit each other written
questions, called interrogatories, which they were supposed to review
with their clients and return. Ostensibly, they sought this information to
flesh out their knowledge and prepare for the next state of discovery-
depositions-in which they interviewed each other's witnesses under
oath. But Karen knew that wasn't how it worked. With most written
discovery, she notes, "everybody objects to everybody else's questions."
The case bogs down; then, after a period of meaningful delay the lawyers
come back and horse-trade, saying, "We'll withdraw this question if you
answer that one.'
4 6
(b) Did the reciprocity rule influence Koskoff to agree to an extension
when Doyle joined the litigation? Consider the following:
"I'm going to put this case on trial unless you both decide not to,"
[Judge] Ballen warned them. Koskoff smiled ambiguously, realizing he
had gotten what he wanted-and might do better not to take it. All he
had to do was say no to an extension and he and Doyle would be picking
a jury in six weeks. That was exactly what he and Bernard had been try-
ing to engineer for almost two years, since they'd filed the offers of judg-
ment. A trial sooner rather than later would benefit him and hobble
Doyle.
And yet he held back. The case was now between him and Doyle, and
the two of them had too much other business together, particularly the
Yale case, for Koskoff to want Doyle to feel that he had taken unfair ad-
vantage. On the other hand, if he accepted a delay, Doyle would owe
him. Whatever he decided, Koskoff knew Doyle would have numerous
occasions to repay him, and would, aggressively, when it suited him.
47




Scarcity also influences litigation behavior. The scarcity principle refers to
the observation that "opportunities seem more valuable to us when they are less
available.' 4 9 Consider the following explanation:
46. WERTH, supra note 1, at 79-80.
47. Id. at 262.
48. See id. at 363-64.
49. CIALDINI, supra note 42, at 205 (emphasis omitted).
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Collectors of everything from baseball cards to antiques are keenly aware
of the scarcity principle's influence in determining the worth of an item.
As a rule, if an item is rare or becoming rare, it is more valuable. Espe-
cially enlightening on the importance of scarcity in the collectibles mar-
ket is the phenomenon of the "precious mistake." Flawed items-a
blurred stamp or a double-struck coin-are sometimes the most valued of
all. Thus, a stamp carrying a three-eyed likeness of George Washington
is anatomically incorrect, aesthetically unappealing, and yet highly
sought after. There is instructive irony here: Imperfections that would
otherwise make for rubbish make for prized possessions when they bring
along an abiding scarcity.
°
* * * Notes & Questions ***
(1) Can you think of any instances where the scarcity principle may have in-
fluenced litigation and settlement behavior in the Sabia case? How about the
threat of Little Tony's death as an inducement to resolve the case more quickly?
51
The threat of trial? 52 Other deadlines? Do you think that deadlines and the scar-
city principle explain the prevalence of apparent "courthouse-steps" settlements?
For more on deadlines as scarcity, consider the following excerpt from Cialdini:
[P]eople frequently find themselves doing what they wouldn't much care
to do simply because the time to do so is running out. The adept mer-
chandiser makes this tendency pay off by arranging and publicizing cus-
tomer deadlines that generate interest where none may have existed be-
fore. Concentrated instances of this approach often occur in movie ad-
vertising. In fact, I recently noticed that one theater owner, with remark-
able singleness of purpose, had managed to invoke the scarcity principle




Litigants may also seek to vindicate their rights or to restore equity to inequi-
table relationships through the litigation process. Consider the following excerpt,
in which Russell Korobkin and I tested for this in a hypothetical litigation prob-
lem:
We provided subjects with a simple landlord-tenant dispute. Subjects
were told that they signed a six-month lease to live in an off-campus
apartment beginning September 1. After two months the heater broke
down. Although they immediately notified the landlord and requested
repair, the landlord failed to fix the heater. As a result, according to the
50. Id. at 205.
51. WERTH, supra note 1, at 261.
52. Id. at 296.
53. CIALDINI, supra note 42, at 207.
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scenario, the subjects spent four winter months in a cold apartment at-
tempting to keep warm with a space heater before moving out at the end
of the lease period. Throughout this time period, the subjects had contin-
ued to pay $1,000 per month in rent. After moving out, they learned
from a student legal service lawyer that "there was a good chance" of re-
covering a portion of the $4,000 in rent paid over that four-month period
of time. The lawyer gave neither a specific prediction of the likelihood
of success nor any estimate of the exact magnitude of a judgment. Sub-
jects learned that, with the assistance of their attorney, they had filed an
action in small claims court against the landlord. Prior to the court date,
the landlord offered to settle the case out of court for $900.
The variable tested in this scenario was the landlord's reason for failing
to repair the heater in spite of the tenant's prompt request that he do so.
Group A subjects learned that they had made a number of calls to the
landlord, to no avail. "The landlord promised to fix your heater, but he
never did. A week later, you called him again. Again, he promised to fix
it, but he never did. Over the next several weeks, you called him a half-
dozen times, but he did not return your calls." Group B participants re-
ceived a different explanation: After the second call to the landlord,
"[y]ou learned that he had left the country unexpectedly due to a family
emergency and that he was expected to be gone for several months ......
The given explanation had a significant impact on how likely subjects
were to accept the settlement offer and forgo their day in court. Knowing
that the landlord did not fix the heater because he was out of the country
due to a family emergency, most Group B (Family Emergency) subjects
were willing to accept the landlord's offer and let the matter rest. Their
mean response was 3.41 [on a 5-point scale where I = "definitely reject"
and 5 = "definitely accept"]. Group A subjects (Broken Promise), in con-
trast, .were more likely to reject the $900 offer and risk a less favorable
decision in small claims court than to accept the offer. Their average
score was 2.60. The difference between the two groups is highly signifi-
cant. Fifty-nine percent of the Family Emergency subjects said they
would "definitely" or "probably" accept the settlement offer, while only
thirty-five percent of the Broken Promise subjects provided those same
responses. Thirty percent of the Broken Promise subjects said they
would "definitely reject" the $900 settlement offer in favor of small
claims court, while only nine percent of the Family Emergency subjects
would "definitely reject" the offer ....
The very different responses of the Family Emergency and Broken Prom-
ise subjects provide empirical support for the hypothesis that litigant vic-
tims seek more than just monetary damages from the legal system. They
seek to restore equity to inequitable relationships. When litigants feel
they have been treated badly by the other side, the chances of settlement
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decrease because litigants are more likely to seek retaliation or vindica-
tion of their moral position in addition to monetary damages.
5 4
* * * Notes & Questions * * *
(1) Were any of the litigants involved in the Sabia case motivated by a need
for vindication?
(a) Consider Dr. Humes:
Humes heard about the negotiations from Arnold Bai. She was hardly
cheered by them. She knew now that unless St. Paul withdrew its offer
and elected to stand by her as staunchly as it had Sherrington, there
would be no trial. The realization pained her. It destroyed any chance of
public vindication, although in truth few people outside Norwalk's medi-
cal community knew about the cloud she was under. Still, seeing how
the experience of the trial had almost ruined Sherrington may have
caused her to reconsider. As Haskell often pointed out, once a case set-
tled, it sank forever from public view. Humes had to agree that there was
release in burying the past. Doctors settled claims all the time simply to
avoid being stigmatized. Even without publicity, Humes had been tar-
nished enough.55
(b) Consider Bernard's ruminations on the Sabias and on Tony in particu-
lar:
Bernard was enraged when he considered what they'd [the Sabias] been
through because of Little Tony. He admired them, Tony especially, and
knew their hardships wouldn't lift until the case was at an end. He and
Tony had talked frequently since Donna moved out, and Bernard knew
that Tony wanted more than anything else the vindication of a trial. He
had done all he could to keep his family from coming apart. What he
craved now was recognition, not for his efforts but for his injury. Tony
wanted the world to acknowledge his family's suffering and concede that
they had been wronged.56
(c) And consider Tony's reaction to Doyle's remarks at the second media-
tion:
Here was Tony's final, consuming plaint: The world had no idea how he
and Donna and Little Tony had suffered, and that ignorance itself was the
larger crime, even more than whatever had been done to them in the first
place. He wanted Doyle to acknowledge that the hospital was at fault for
killing Michael and devastating Little Tony and making him and Donna
54. Korobkin & Guthrie, supra note 21, at 144-47.
55. WERTH, supra note 1, at 207.
56. Id. at 298.
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wrecks. He wanted Travelers to pay, dearly. But what he seemed to
want even more was a formal recognition of what his family had been put
through, how violated and alone they were, and what it had taken for
them to survive. He wanted Doyle and Casey to concede that he, Tony,
had withstood all the mental abuse the world could throw at him and was
still standing.57
(2) Is there anything other than a victory at trial that might meet a litigant's
need for vindication? What about an apology?
58
IV. CONCLUSION
It is conventional wisdom that litigants and lawyers settle cases in "the shadow of
the law.",59 Law certainly informs settlement,60 but settlement is also a process
influenced mightily by economic, strategic, and psychological factors. Given the
prevalence of settlement in the civil justice system, law students and lawyers must
appreciate not only the potentially applicable legal rules but also these non-legal
factors, the very factors that appear to have driven much litigation behavior in the
Sabia case.
57. Id. at 359.
58. See Korobkin & Guthrie, supra note 21, at 147-50 (demonstrating experimentally that an apol-
ogy increases the likelihood that a litigant motivated by a need for vindication will settle for a fair
value). For a general introduction to apologies in civil litigation, see Jonathan R. Cohen, Advising
Clients to Apologize, 72 S. CAL. L. REV. 1009 (1999).
59. See Mnookin & Kornhauser, supra note 10.
60. See Ray D. Madoff, Lurking in the Shadow: The Unseen Hand of Doctrine in Dispute Resolu-
tion, 76 S. CAL. L. REV. 161 (2002).
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